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AbstrAct: This article examines China’s ability to influence conflicts 
beyond its immediate area through both conventional and unorth-
odox means. Decision-makers and intelligence analysts at all levels 
should note America’s influence within the Pacific region is becom-
ing increasingly linked to its influence in Africa, the Middle East, and 
other areas of  interest to rising East Asian powers. For the United 
States to maximise its strategic capabilities, it would need to maintain 
a robust military presence in all these regions. 
The United States has compelling reasons to maintain a command-
ing military presence in the Western Pacific. This has been apparent 
since US Commodore Lawrence Kearney’s timely intervention to secure 
American trading privileges with China at the close of the first Opium 
War, 1839-1842. Nevertheless, at a time when the United States is 
moving an increasing proportion of its military assets to the Far East as 
part of a so-called “rebalance” to Asia, those with an interest in strategic 
affairs do well to ask where the fulcrum of the metaphorical scales might 
be. If America shifts forces to the Far East at the same time as the 
emerging powers of that region significantly improve their ability to act 
where the United States is reducing its presence, Washington may find 
the challenge of engaging those powers more complicated than ever. 
Although this shift may remain the wisest course of action, military 
commanders and civilian decisionmakers would be wise to prepare for 
its complexities.
The emerging Asian power of greatest interest to the United States is 
undoubtedly the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Happily for American 
leaders, persuasive scholarly and professional literature suggests the 
PRC’s long-range power projection capabilities remain unexceptional. 
Such literature, however, rests on a relatively narrow understanding of 
power projection. This article reviews the PRC’s ability to act in poten-
tially violent conflicts beyond its borders and argues Beijing is pursuing 
a strategy which magnifies its influence beyond what its current military 
assets seem to allow.
US Army Field Manual 100-7 defines power projection as “the ability 
. . . to apply any combination of economic, diplomatic, informational, 
or military instruments of national power.”1 This article suggests China 
will be able to use civilian political activists, private security personnel, 
co-operative foreign forces and other non-traditional assets to replace 
“military instruments” in this mosaic.2 Clearly, non-traditional assets 
1      US Department of  the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7 
(Washington, DC: US Department of  the Army, 1995).
2     Some material from this article was previously presented by the author in a paper titled 
“Beside the Obvious: The Beijing-Seoul Security Relationship Beyond the Korean Peninsula” at the 
20th Anniversary of  the Geneva-Agreed Framework "New Approaches on the Korean Peninsula: 
Theories and Strategy," Conference, Plaza Hotel, Seoul, October 10-11, 2014.
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will only be available at times, in places, and under political circum-
stances which favor their use. Such assets will seldom be strong enough 
to defeat conventional armed forces of any size, but the PRC’s current 
“economic” importance and “diplomatic” situation permit them to 
combat other non-traditional forces, such as criminal gangs, and even to 
play a symbolic role in disagreements among states. Field Manual 100-7 
goes on to note “an effective power-projection capability serves to deter 
potential adversaries, demonstrates . . . resolve, and carr[y] out military 
operations anywhere in the world.”3 This article suggests China’s non-
traditional forces will be useful for the first two of these purposes and 
may – in situations of interest to the PRC – even be valuable for the 
third. 
The first section of this article reviews the argument that the PRC’s 
long-range power projection capabilities are modest and easily quantifi-
able. A second section questions this argument, drawing on the “empty 
fortress” concept introduced to Western scholars and policy analysts 
by Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross in their early study of China’s 
post-cold war security policy. A third section re-examines China’s devel-
oping power projection capabilities taking a wider range of possibilities 
suggested by  the “empty fortress” and related concepts into account. 
Finally, a conclusion returns to the issue of American policy, noting 
that although it may be sensible for the United States to base a greater 
proportion of its forces in East Asia, Washington’s challenges remain 
global and it must maintain its own global power projection capabilities 
in order to meet them. US commanders and intelligence analysts at all 
levels must remain conscious of these points.
China’s Power Projection Capabilities
Beijing frequently uses low levels of force in international conflicts 
and is acquiring hardware which will allow it to intervene on a larger scale. 
Indeed, those inclined toward an alarmist view of China’s economic and 
military development could find the PRC aggressive. Nevertheless, the 
PRC’s most violent interventions are now decades in the past, and even 
its newest equipment appears insufficient to sustain long-range military 
expeditions against resistance from a militarily capable state. For these 
reasons, scholars and military analysts commonly conclude that Beijing, 
despite its occasional blustering, will pursue conciliatory policies beyond 
its immediate vicinity. One analyst predicts China will scale back its 
involvement in Africa, while others question its ability to uphold its 
current policies even close to its own coastline as the disputed maritime 
territories in East Asia.4 If the PRC is unable to use so-called hard power 
in these places, one may assume any aspirations it might have to inter-
vene in more distant regions such as Latin America are equally doomed.
The history of Chinese power projection is colorful. In 1974 
and again in 1988, the PRC seized strategically valuable islands from 
Vietnam. The 1988 incident featured a naval battle in which Chinese 
3      US Department of  the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations.
4      Jonathan Holslag, “China’s New Security Strategy for Africa,” Parameters 39, no. 2 (Summer 
2009): 36; Jeffrey W. Hornung and Alexander Vuving, “Beijing’s Grand Strategy Failure,” The 
National Interest, January 10, 2014.
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warships sank three Vietnamese vessels.5 More recently, the People’s 
Republic has made a series of incursions into territory it disputes with 
the Philippines. Meanwhile, PRC forces have enforced Beijing’s claims 
to other regions in the South China Sea by boarding non-Chinese ships 
and detaining their crews.6 Farther north, Chinese warships joust with 
their Japanese counterparts over the disputed pieces of land known as 
the Diaoyu Islands in China and the Senkaku Islands in Japan. 
Beijing also dispatches forces to more distant conflicts. Since 2008, 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has conducted anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden. Chinese naval officers have expressed 
an interest in acquiring land bases in the region, and in expanding their 
operations to the Gulf of Guinea.7 Meanwhile, as of early 2014, the PRC 
deploys ground troops and police in nine African countries.8 On the 
other side of the world, China has provided police for recent peacekeep-
ing operations in Haiti.9 After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Chinese 
emergency personnel were among the first non-Haitian relief workers 
to arrive on the scene. 
Since the 1988 clash, however, China’s more provocative expeditions 
have rarely demonstrated any particularly formidable military capabili-
ties. The Chinese forces responsible for challenging Filipino territorial 
claims, for instance, have often been fishermen. Their weapons have fre-
quently been buoys used to mark disputed maritime areas as Chinese.10 
The PRC has gone farther in asserting its claim to the islet known as 
Mischief Reef. Even there, however, China’s actions have consisted of 
little more than covertly building structures on the disputed piece of 
land. Some of these structures may have had value as fortifications, but 
even that is unclear. 
China and the Philippines challenged each other more directly 
in the Scarborough Shoal affair of 2012. That incident began when 
Chinese fishing vessels entered disputed waters, escalated when a 
Filipino warship attempted to arrest the alleged trespassers, and became 
a two-sided military confrontation when naval units belonging to the 
PRC came to the fishermen’s defence.  The fact that both sides openly 
deployed military forces is ominous. It is, however, worth noting that 
the Filipino vessel which initially attempted to apprehend the fishermen 
was a frigate.11 Beijing challenged it with a pair of patrol boats.
There may have been a variety of reasons PRC commanders 
entered this confrontation so outgunned. It is possible that they failed 
5      Jeff  W. Benson, “South China Sea: A History of  Armed Conflict,” USNI News, June 20, 2012, up-
dated February 5, 2013, http://news.usni.org/2012/06/20/south-china-sea-history-armed-conflict,.
6      National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2013 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 
2013), 228.
7      Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “Piracy’s Next Frontier: A Role for China in Gulf  
of  Guinea Security?” The National Interest , December 10, 2013; and Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and 
Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College 
Review, 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 59-78. 
8      United Nations, “UN Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country, 31 August 2014,” http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/aug14_3.pdf.
9      Nicholas Thomas, “Interventions with Chinese Characteristics,” in China and International 
Security: History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy, Vol. 3, Donovan C. Chau and Thomas M. Kane, eds 
(Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2014), 290-291.
10      Stanley Meyer, Incident at Mischief  Reef: Implications for the Philippines, China and the United States 
(Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1996), 7.
11      National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2013, 225.
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to anticipate such an event, and the patrol boats were the only assets 
they had available. Nevertheless, the fact they were willing to respond 
in the way in which they did suggests they had little intention of resolv-
ing the dispute violently. Chinese leaders almost certainly intended to 
remind their Filipino counterparts the odds in a more general war would 
be somewhat different, but the actual confrontation remained largely 
symbolic. 
The PRC has used military assets more openly in the Senkaku/
Diaoyu dispute. This signifies a certain degree of boldness among 
Chinese policymakers, since Japan would appear to be a more dangerous 
opponent than the Philippines. Moreover, the bilateral defence treaty 
between the United States and Japan explicitly binds the United States 
to protect Japanese-held islands in the contested region from attack.12 
In 2010, Washington underscored its willingness to uphold this com-
mitment by contributing ships, aircraft, and over 10,000 personnel 
to a joint US-Japan military exercise which simulated the defence of 
the disputed territory.13 Neither Japan’s own capabilities, nor its close 
relationship with the United States, deters the PRC from dispatching 
warships and military aircraft to assert their presence near the contested 
zone. Moreover, since the late 1990s, Beijing has mounted such forays 
with increasing frequency.14 
Again, however, China typically carries out its most provocative 
actions with vessels and personnel incapable of holding their own in 
an actual battle. Chinese warships have typically remained in the back-
ground during confrontations in the East China Sea. When Japanese 
authorities have accused the PLAN of going further, the Chinese have 
often denied it.15 Just as Chinese fishing vessels have mounted many 
of the PRC’s challenges to Filipino territorial claims, putatively civil-
ian Chinese political activists have often taken the lead in penetrating 
Japanese-claimed territory.16 One may reasonably speculate these activ-
ists enjoy at least tacit support from Beijing. However, Chinese authorities 
would be entitled to counter that Japanese and Taiwanese citizens have 
also sailed into disputed regions of the East China Sea to assert their 
nations’ claims, indicating, at a minimum, this tactic is widespread.
Beijing has demonstrated its power projection capabilities more 
convincingly in disaster relief efforts, UN-backed peacekeeping mis-
sions and operations against pirates. China’s anti-piracy patrols off the 
coast of Africa are particularly significant, since they prove PLAN war-
ships can carry out military tasks for extended periods, thousands of 
miles from their home ports. Moreover, the PRC supports these patrols 
using newly-acquired logistical vessels.17 From an operational point of 
view, this allows PLAN personnel to develop their skills at using new 
equipment to carry out more ambitious operations, and from a political 
12      Alessio Patalano, “The East China Sea, Maritime Strategy and Sino-Japanese Security 
Relations,” in China and International Security: History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy, Vol. 3, Donovan 
C. Chau and Thomas M. Kane, eds. (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2014), 127.
13      Ibid.
14      Ibid., 128.
15      “China Media: Japan Radar Lock,” BBC News, March 19, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-china-21840243.
16      “Japan Holds PRC Island Activists,” Taipei Times, March 27, 2004, http://www.taipeitimes.
com/News/world/archives/2004/03/27/2003107943/1.
17      Yves-Heng Lim, China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 82..
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point of view, it signals Beijing’s interest in doing so. Meanwhile, the 
US Department of Defence reports the PRC is reconfiguring its ground 
forces to make them easier to transport, and may build a new amphibi-
ous vessel within the decade.18
Nevertheless, the PRC has not acquired enough support ships to 
sustain sufficiently large naval forces to challenge more dangerous 
opponents. Since maritime transportation is indispensable for support-
ing expeditionary forces of any size and sea power is the surest means 
of protecting transport vessels from hostile action, the fact the PRC has 
such a limited ability to carry out long-range naval operations seems to 
constrain its overall power projection capability to a similar degree. The 
PRC’s inability to sustain large naval forces at long range will, among 
other things, sharply restrict the role of its much-publicized new aircraft 
carrier. Beijing’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) contin-
ues to acquire new refuelling and transport aircraft, which may allow 
the PRC to compensate for the logistical deficiencies of its maritime 
forces to some degree, but the numbers of new transport aircraft are also 
modest, and the overall point stands.19 
Thus, the self-described Offensive Realist Yves-Heng Lim con-
cludes, for the “foreseeable future, the primary task of the PLA Navy 
will continue to be defined at the regional level.”20 Jonathan Holslag, 
concludes the PRC will remain dependent on the good will of other 
powers to protect its overseas interests, and it will moderate its policies 
accordingly.21 Jeffrey W Hornug and Alexander Vuving add the PRC 
sometimes ignores the reality of its military weakness and goads distant 
opponents, which merely exposes its claim to great power status as 
hollow.22 
"Empty Fortress"
Beijing’s signals of willingness to use force in external disputes do 
indeed appear to contain a substantial element of bluff. Scholars Andrew 
J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross would not be surprised. In 1997, they 
published an influential book suggesting that the rising China would 
compensate for its various weaknesses by falling back on the culturally 
hallowed strategy of defending so-called “empty fortresses.”23 Nathan 
and Ross have reiterated this idea in more recent works, and other 
authors have taken it up as well.24 The phrase “empty fortress” comes 
from the classic Chinese novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, presumably 
written during the Ming Dynasty. In this story, the commander of a 
depleted army feigns brash confidence in order to scare off powerful 
18     Office of  the Secretary of  Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of  China, 2014, April 24, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_
DoD_China_Report.pdf.
19      A former PLA colonel discusses the PRC’s military airlift capabilities in Yue Gang, “PLA 
Must Protect China’s Overseas Interests,” China.org, April 24, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/opin-
ion/2013-04/24/content_28642897.htm.
20      Yves-Heng Lim, China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach,165.
21      Holslag, “China’s New Security Strategy for Africa,” 36.
22      Hornung and Vuving, “Beijing’s Grand Strategy Failure,”
23      Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for 
Security (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997), passim.
24      Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012), passim; Andrew Scobell, Ely Ratner, and Michael Beckley, China’s Strategy 
Toward South and Central Asia: An Empty Fortress (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), passim.
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enemies. Those who find the analogy appropriate might note, in Romance 
of the Three Kingdoms, the ruse worked. 
As Hornug and Vuving point out, it is risky to bluff in direct con-
frontations with superior opponents. In more complex situations, one 
may use pretense with greater hope of success. Today’s PRC enjoys an 
abundance of convenient complications. Not only do Beijing’s circum-
stances provide it with opportunities to get away with overplaying its 
hand, they allow it to enter many of the conflicts which interest it the 
most with forces materially capable of following through on their threats.
Chinese leaders must anticipate situations in which they might wish 
to defy the will of powerful opponents. As previously noted, the PRC 
routinely challenges its East Asian neighbours. Sino-Indian relations are 
also tense. The United States has close relations with most of the PRC’s 
rivals in these disputes, and may also oppose aspects of Beijing’s policies 
for reasons of its own. Nevertheless, the PRC and its state opponents 
have consistently prioritized the cooperative aspects of their relation-
ships over confrontation.
All of them have compelling reasons to continue doing so. 
Co-operation is normally a happier state of affairs than conflict, and it 
typically appears to be even when it is not. Moreover, China, America 
and the other Pacific Rim states rely upon one another economically to 
a degree which is exceptional even by twenty-first century standards. 
The costs of a lengthy crisis, let alone a war, could easily become ruinous 
for all concerned. The fact that the PRC is a nuclear power gives even 
its most belligerent state opponents an incentive to behave moderately. 
Meanwhile, most of the PRC’s occasional rivals have demonstrated 
a corresponding willingness to become its occasional allies. Vietnam’s 
recent policies provide a typical example of such behavior. Vietnam and 
China contest ownership of potentially oil-rich regions of the South 
China Sea, and in 2012, Chinese authorities seized two Vietnamese 
fishing vessels and their crews in the disputed zone.25 Events such as this 
undoubtedly contributed to the Vietnamese government’s decision to 
forge a closer military relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, 
even as Hanoi explored the possibility of providing logistical support 
for American warships, it also welcomed opportunities to carry out joint 
naval operations with the PLAN.26
Indeed, there are occasions in which the PRC can use its expedition-
ary capabilities – real and perceived – to strengthen its relations with 
well-established members of the international community, including the 
United States. Few would deny Beijing’s efforts to provide disaster relief, 
support UN peacekeeping missions and suppress piracy contribute to 
the common good. Andrew Erickson of the US Naval War College 
and Austin Strange of the China Maritime Studies Institute argue that 
Washington should encourage the PRC to take a greater role in global 
security affairs in order to promote cooperation between Beijing and 
other great powers.27 They are unlikely to be the only influential Western 
thinkers on security matters to take this position. 
25      National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2013, 228.
26      Ibid., 229-30.
27      Erickson and Strange, “Piracy’s Next Frontier: A Role for China in Gulf  of  Guinea Security?”
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As long as these circumstances prevail, the PRC will be able to take 
advantage of its sailors’ increasing experience with patrolling distant 
waters, its ground forces’ increasing capability to deploy far from China 
and its air forces’ increasing capacity to support long-range operations 
even while its logistical capabilities remain dangerously incomplete. At 
this time, the PLAN is unlikely to find itself in a position in which it 
must defend expeditionary forces’ lines of communication from hostile 
navies. Indeed, even the PRC’s bolder actions seldom attract the level 
of diplomatic opposition a so-called rogue state might receive. To the 
contrary, when Beijing times its provocations wisely, it can use them to 
pressure potential opponents into accommodation.
The Scarborough Shoal affair reminds us that Beijing faces dip-
lomatic risks when it takes strong positions in external disputes, but 
it also reminds us that some of the outcomes of such confrontations 
may well favor China. While the incident was in progress, Washington 
supported the Philippines.28 Countries throughout Southeast Asia are 
actively developing security ties to the United States, and one may 
reasonably speculate the events of 2012 encouraged them to continue 
this process with a renewed sense of urgency. Nevertheless, commenta-
tors for Japan’s National Institute for Defence Studies suggest that the 
Scarborough Shoal incident also revealed limits to Washington’s willing-
ness to confront China.29 Manila subsequently offered a cool response 
to suggestions that it might permit US armed forces to make greater 
use of Filipino territory and the same commentators interpret this as an 
attempt to compensate for the combination of Chinese assertiveness and 
American vacillation by placating the PRC.30
Nonetheless, even in the forgiving international environment which 
Beijing currently enjoys, there may be times when it actually wishes to 
fight. Beijing may, for instance, need to protect its economic interests in 
war-torn regions. The PRC may wish to protect its supporters in other 
parts of the world, and to command the kind of influence which states 
achieve by offering such protection. Once again, the fact the PRC is 
developing some of the capabilities it needs for long-range operations is 
relevant, even others remain lacking. Once again, the fact that the PRC 
is developing a reputation for boldness may enhance the psychological 
impact of its actions.
Layers of Chinese Capability
Moreover, Beijing cultivates indirect means to apply force in places 
far from China. Often, other states with greater access to the areas 
in question may be willing to act on the PRC’s behalf. When official 
forces are inadequate or unavailable, the PRC may supplement them 
using politically or financially motivated civilian organisations. A 2014 
article in China Daily describes how Chinese energy companies operating 
in Iraq defend their assets using “three ‘layers’” of security, with Iraqi 
government security forces offering “wide-ranging protection,” police 
28      National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2013, 227.
29      Ibid.
30      Ibid., 228.
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operating under direct corporate control guarding worksites and armed 
Chinese nationals providing “the innermost cover.” 31
This arrangement appears reasonable. Other firms based in other 
countries rely on similar types of protection. The China Daily article is 
significant, however, because it confirms that Chinese corporate manag-
ers in a strategically critical industry view assets nominally under the 
control of other countries’ governments as “layers” of their own secu-
rity establishment. One may assume they will use similar multinational 
combinations of state and private forces elsewhere when it suits their 
purposes, and other PRC-based concerns, including the government, 
will do the same. The fact China’s largest petroleum companies either 
are, or recently were, state-owned reinforces the hypothesis that the 
PRC’s political leadership recognizes the various “layers” of proxy forces 
as instruments of foreign policy.
The PRC is expanding its access to potential proxies. Scholar Steven 
Childs illustrates one aspect of Beijing’s quest for overseas supporters 
with his 2014 network analysis of patterns in Chinese exports of military 
hardware. Once, Childs notes, Beijing’s arms trading policies focused on 
generating income to support its own defense industrial base.32 Today, 
he finds, it seems increasingly interested in selling military hardware to 
a wider range of states, even when its new trading relationships are not 
particularly profitable.33 Childs also finds Beijing’s new customers tend 
to be located in areas which are rich in natural resources, or which are, 
for other reasons, politically important to China.34 
Childs infers Beijing has restructured its dealings to emphasise the 
goal of establishing closer ties to strategically valuable partners.35 As 
Childs notes, a body of academic research confirms arms providers 
gain influence over their customers’ security policies.36 One might also 
observe this method of cultivating allies has the potential to increase 
interoperability between forces from the importing and exporting 
states. This interoperability facilitates combining various types of 
organizations from various countries concerned in “layers.” The PRC 
also actively pursues joint military exercises with states throughout the 
developing world, and this activity serves similar purposes.37 
The deepest layer of forces protecting China’s oil interests in Iraq 
consists of civilian Chinese security guards.  Beijing enjoys expanding 
access to these assets as well. As recently as 2006, researchers Allison 
Stanger and Mark Eric Williams note the PRC had virtually no domestic 
private military companies (PMCs) and would be unlikely to “sanction 
31      “Concern Surrounds Chinese security forces in Iraq,” China Daily, June 24, 2014, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-06/24/content_17612002.htm.
32      Steven J. Childs, “Sino-American Global Security Strategy: A Network Perspective,” in China 
and International Security: History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy, Vol. 3, Donovan C. Chau and Thomas 
M. Kane, eds. (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2014), 187.
33      Ibid., 201.
34      Ibid.
35      Ibid., 187.
36      Ibid.
37      The PRC’s Ministry of  Defence discusses its policies on multinational training exercises in 
some depth in its 2013 White Paper. See “Safeguarding World Peace and Regional Stability” in The 
Diversified Employment of  China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Information Office of  the State Council, 2013), 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2013-04/16/content_4442756.htm.
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[their] development.”38 This was, in fact, misleading even at the time. 
At least one PRC-based firm had allegedly been recruiting veterans of 
the People’s Armed Police and the Chinese military’s special forces 
to provide a worldwide bodyguard service since 2004.39 Since then, 
China’s private security industry has expanded dramatically, in size, 
visibility, and the range of international operations which it routinely 
undertakes.40 Since Stanger and Williams were correct to suggest this 
industry could not exist in the PRC without state approval, and equally 
correct to note Beijing “jealously” guards its military assets, including 
intangible resources such as “strategies and skill sets,” one may infer the 
Chinese government expects these private security firms to be useful 
and is confident it can control them. 
Moreover, Beijing will often find growing populations of Chinese 
people in the places which interest it most. Chinese firms operat-
ing abroad tend to take employees with them, even in labor-intensive 
industries. An estimated 847,000 Chinese nationals worked for PRC-
based companies outside China in 2012.41 The total number of Chinese 
expatriates is far larger. One report suggests over one million Chinese 
nationals currently live in Africa alone, up from perhaps 100,000 at the 
end of the 1990s.42 This increase is in addition to the conservatively 
estimated 35,000,000 haiwai huaren (overseas Chinese) living through-
out Asia and the Americas, who typically hold citizenship in the states 
where they reside but maintain varying levels of political and economic 
involvement with their ancestral country.43
From a diplomatic perspective, this diaspora offers Beijing a mixed 
blessing. The greater the size of any population, the greater the frequency 
with which members will fall into various forms of embarrassment, 
whether innocently, accidentally, or through genuine misdeeds. In situ-
ations where public opinion in any of the countries concerned might 
matter, Beijing may find many people hold the Chinese state and Chinese 
corporations responsible for such incidents, whatever their cause. Beijing 
has publically accepted responsibility to protect Chinese citizens living 
abroad from the assorted risks associated with living in other countries, 
and this may not always be easy or convenient for China.44
Nevertheless, the existence of the Chinese diaspora broadens 
Beijing’s options for influencing external disputes. At a minimum, it 
provides the PRC’s leadership with a pretext for involving its country 
in any region where substantial numbers of Chinese people reside. Not 
38      Allison Stanger and Mark Eric Williams, “Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs 
of  Outsourcing Security,” Yale Journal of  International Affairs, 2, no. 1, (Fall/Winter 2006): 14-15.
39      Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Enter China’s Security Firms,” The Diplomat, February 
21, 2012.
40      Ibid.
41      Ibid.
42      Xan Rice, “China’s Economic Invasion of  Africa,” The Guardian, February 6, 2011. 
43      The figure of  35,000,000 comes from the Chinese embassy in the United States and is based 
on data from the Chinese Academy of  Social Sciences, see CASS Report: Number of  Overseas Chinese 
Up to 35 MLN (Washington, DC: Embassy of  the People’s Republic of  China in the United States 
of  America), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/qwgz/t297510.htm. Chinese media sources re-
port a figure of  50,000,000, see “Reforms Urged to Attract Overseas Chinese,” Xinhua, March 11, 
2012, reprinted by China.org.cn, http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2012/2012-03/11/
content_24865428.htm.
44     “New Situation, New Challenges and New Missions,” in The Diversified Employment of  China’s 
Armed Forces (Beijing: Information Office of  the State Council, 2013), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/
Database/WhitePapers/2013-04/16/content_4442756.htm.
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only may the PRC act to protect Chinese expatriates against imminent 
danger, former PLA officer Yue Gang suggests Beijing may legitimately 
use military force to deter such threats before they materialize, presum-
ably through preemptive action.45 There may be circumstances in which 
the PRC can call on at least a fraction of the diaspora for various forms 
of action. Mao-era radicals repeatedly attempted to mobilise the haiwai 
huaren against the Indonesian regime, and putatively civilian Chinese 
activists continue to play a central role in the PRC’s territorial disputes, 
which suggests meaningful numbers of Chinese citizens are currently 
prepared to take risks for what they perceive as patriotic causes, with or 
without formal state support.46 When large numbers of Chinese over-
seas workers find themselves under threat, one may reasonably speculate 
PRC security forces will be able to organize them to help provide for 
their own protection, if only through unarmed vigilance.
Conclusion
In summary, the PRC presents itself as a nation with global inter-
ests. Its combination of traditional and non-traditional power projection 
assets will frequently allow it to act upon those interests. Although this 
improvisational approach to expeditionary warfare cannot be as reliable 
as one sustained by robust air and naval forces, it compels the rest of us 
to take Beijing’s position seriously. Thus, China can, and quite possibly 
will, use its non-traditional assets to persuade, prop up – and pressure 
– weaker political actors in areas such as Africa, South Asia, Central 
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East in much the same way as it 
has historically influenced the smaller states of East and Southeast Asia. 
When terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and violent protesters threaten 
its interests, it will be increasingly capable of resisting them, and also 
of claiming a role in shaping any international response. Moreover, as 
the PRC develops its armed forces, one may reasonably expect it to use 
them to consolidate whatever influence it gains with its current mix of 
capabilities.
Happily for all concerned, China’s interests and those of other pow-
erful nations such as the United States will often be the same. This is 
one of the reasons the PRC is relatively free to exploit non-traditional 
approaches to power projection, and it is also a reason American leaders 
may feel relatively safe in permitting their Chinese counterparts to do 
so. Nevertheless, Americans in particular should be aware reducing their 
own presence in areas of interest to Beijing, will increase their reliance 
on the same indirect and implied means of projecting influence the PRC 
must depend on. Those who hope to use such methods to affect the 
outcome of a dispute will often find it necessary to take positions which 
they may be reluctant to back up. 
This possibility in itself is worrisome, since a world in which two 
powers who occasionally find themselves at odds must both base a 
measurable proportion of their diplomacy on bluster is not necessarily 
a safer one. Moreover, America’s strategy in East Asia is, to quote US 
Pacific Command (PACOM) commander Samuel J. Locklear III, one 
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of “strengthen[ing] alliances and partnerships, maintain[ing] an assured 
presence in the region, and effectively communicat[ing] our intent and 
resolve.”47 To achieve these objectives, America not only needs to be able 
to use force when necessary, it needs for others to perceive it has this 
ability. For those who wish to take their enemies by surprise, the fact 
indirect means are often subtle can make them particularly useful; but 
for those who wish to maintain a reputation for strength and reliability, 
it is more likely to limit their utility. 
This article has argued the PRC’s reliance on indirect means has 
allowed outside observers to underrate China’s capabilities, and those 
who hope to communicate resolve must strive to avoid being underrated. 
Consequently, US planners need to remain conscious that America’s 
prestige in East Asia is likely to be partially dependent on America’s 
perceived presence in regions where East Asian powers themselves are 
active, and that for the PRC in particular, this area is expanding. Samir 
Tata persuasively argued for the US to “counterbalance” Beijing, it must 
maintain robust capabilities in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.48 As 
the PRC’s interests and activities become increasingly global, one will 
be able to make a similar case for maintaining US capabilities in Africa, 
Central Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. Even when US leaders 
determine it is in America’s interest to support China – and this may 
often be the case – they may find it useful to have the means to do so 
actively.
For senior policymakers, this may seem like a familiar and impos-
sible dilemma. No nation has the resources to be as strong as it might 
like everywhere it might like. Strategy consists largely of choosing priori-
ties, and admitting that one’s choices can never be ideal. Nevertheless, 
PACOM commanders do well to co-ordinate their plans with other 
regional commands. Since the global politics of US-Asian relations are 
complex, and important events may take place in areas where relatively 
few American personnel are present, lower-level commanders and 
civilians representing the US government (whether formally or not) 
throughout the world should understand they may play a role in achiev-
ing America’s policy objectives in the Pacific region. They may be the 
ones to assess situations in areas where the PRC is becoming involved, 
and the relationships they have formed with their local counterparts may 
often be what permits America to respond. Although the overall decision 
to reallocate a greater proportion of American assets to the Pacific region 
may well be the wisest one, this article suggests US civilian authorities 
and military commanders should be aware of the compromises they are 
making, and should craft their policies at lower levels to engage China 
as effectively outside East Asia as possible.
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